April 15, 2026 @ 16h00 – 17h30 CET
In our fourth session, we welcomed Morten Byskov (Tilburg University) to discuss his paper “The Right to Climate Adaptation” (2024). Byskov argues that individuals and communities affected by climate change through no fault of their own hold a right to climate adaptation. This right applies not only to those currently harmed but also to climate-vulnerable future communities, emphasizing proactive adaptation and acknowledging that vulnerability extends beyond present impacts and communities. Central to this framework is the lack of direct responsibility for climate vulnerability: communities that suffer negative climate impacts without benefiting from emissions are often constrained in action by their socio-economic conditions, and are without blame for their exposure. It thus recognizes the inseparability of social and environmental factors and the difficulty of tracing causality between them.
We started to discuss the nature of the right to adaptation: Byskov argues that it stems from a broader right to protection from climate harms, and its necessity arises when this fundamental right fails. If a right to protection through mitigation is acknowledged, a separate right to adaptation must also follow, given the inequalities faced where harms are already occurring or cannot be avoided. While science plays a crucial role in identifying future risks and interested communities, the uncertainty of climate projections should not hinder recognition of this right. Byskov defends an interest-based approach, grounding the right to climate adaptation in morally important interests such as life and well-being. This framework extends to future generations and marginalized groups, though translating it into political or legal contexts remains challenging. Still, acknowledging the right rather than merely imposing duties is fundamental to ensure agency of the victims and prevent reinforcing existing power inequalities.
We then explored which challenges might arise when considering how the right to adaptation addresses the entanglement of responsibility and historical injustices, identifying climate-vulnerable communities to be entitled to counter or reduce climate impacts. The goal is not simple resource redistribution but the creation of real opportunities to achieve valued outcomes. Those responsible bear duties of reparation, from material assistance to ensuring the freedom to build resilience and adaptive capacity. Drawing on the capability approach, Byskov argues that duty bearers must consider personal, social, and environmental constraints of the harmed communities to guarantee them minimally sufficient means within ecological limits. This approach is inherently democratic, emphasizing bottom-up participation to express and pursue self-determined goals. A further challenge lies in identifying such communities. Byskov’s flexible model traces vulnerability across time, linking present exposure to centuries of colonization and exploitation. Recognizing this continuity allows vulnerable groups to claim climate adaptation rights rooted in historical harm. Although the framework’s complexity requires further practical elaboration to avoid reproducing injustice, its nuance is precisely what makes it valuable.
Finally, we discussed the intersection of Byskov’s argument with an intersectional approach. We focused on gender, since women often exhibit specific vulnerabilities to climate change, yet treating them homogeneously as a group is problematic, given intersectional differences in privilege and context. Rather than claiming a universal “right to climate adaptation” for women, it may be more appropriate to view vulnerability through contextual relationships between groups, acknowledging how women’s positions vary across socio-economic and cultural settings.
Organisers: Sapna Kumar and Futura Venuto
