October 29, 2025 @ 16h00 – 17h30 CET
We discussed Koskinen and Rolin’s chapter, “Structural Epistemic Injustice in Global Contexts,” published in the book “Global Epistemologies and Philosophies of Science.” The aim of the volume is to bring a diverse collection of philosophical texts on the global dimension of knowledge and science. The chapter addresses epistemic injustice on a global and structural level.
The seminar began by reviewing various forms of epistemic injustice, highlighting its different varieties such as testimonial smothering, wilful hermeneutical ignorance, discriminatory and distributive epistemic injustice. In a global context, these injustices take on specific forms. Epistemic marginalisation (Connell, 2014) happens where scholars in the periphery must constantly seek recognition and justify their agendas to those in the global centers or metropoles. Another global epistemic injustice is epistemicide which is the killing or dissolution of entire knowledge systems, cultures and societies often observed in the assimilation of Indigenous knowledge systems.
A major part of the seminar circled around the question what global philosophy of science precisely is. The concept aims to capture various ways in which philosophers of science can contribute to addressing global problems. It also refers to the diversity of knowledge practices around the world, without reducing it to the importance of scientific knowledge production. Furthermore, doing global epistemology is – in a similar spirit as standpoint epistemology – reflecting on one’s situatedness.
There is, however, a tension between global and pluralism, and global and local. In academia, for example, we need global collaborations and therefore a lingua franca, which is English today. This places not only a burden on local knowledge embedded in local languages, but also exposes the limits of global concepts, collaborations and narratives.
Given epistemic injustices in institutions, the question remains how to reform these very institutions. There is the risk, however, to suggest problematic institutional changes to achieve something, without considering the unwanted predicted change that could happen elsewhere. It’s not easy to see how institutions could change in ways that the results would be better than the current ones. Furthermore, in the epistemic injustice literature the different features of this particular injustice is well theorized. There is, however, the remaining challenge and lacuna how this injustice can be avoided, prevented and remedied on both an individual and structural level.
Organisers: Sapna Kumar and Futura Venuto