November 12, 2025 @ 16h00 – 17h30 CET
The text discussed in this session was a chapter by Manuela Fernández Pinto and Anna Leuschner, titled “Epistemic intimidation and illegitimate value-influences in science” (forthcoming in The Routledge Handbook of Values and Science, ed. by Kevin Elliott and Ted Richards). This chapter offers an overview of their long-term project on epistemic intimidation. With both authors present, the discussion turned lively, touching on the role of power in theorisations of epistemic phenomena, the question of whether epistemic intimidation is always bad, and the role of institutions in addressing such problems.
Pinto and Leuschner define systematic epistemic intimidation as practices targeting “someone in their capacity as an epistemic agent, leading to epistemic harm and orchestrated by politically and economically powerful groups” (ibidem).
Their historical examples, mainly from climate and environmental science, prove that epistemic intimidation constitutes an illegitimate value influence on science. Indeed, they have three major detrimental effects on scientific knowledge production: it encourages scientists to become overly cautious, creates a “chilling effect” and it can contribute to a loss of competent researchers. These consequences can easily compound. Skewed funding priorities, publication biases, and the loss of expertise make research more aligned with established powers and less attentive to marginalized communities and urgent social issues.
One thread of discussion focused on considering what may be specific about epistemic intimidation of scientists and how it relates to attacks launched against other professional groups such as journalists or politicians. This led to questions about the relation between Pinto and Leuschner’s account and feminist theories of epistemic injustice and epistemic oppression. While their work draws on this literature, they hesitate to apply these concepts directly, given that scientists are generally a privileged group and these concepts were developed to capture the experiences of marginalised groups. Still, feminist philosophy remains useful for understanding the systemic ways intimidation operates.
Feminist philosophy of science provides a useful framework here: the focus on systematicity highlights how these attacks are organized, well-funded, and persistent, carried out by actors with resources and influence to maintain pressure over time. Epistemic intimidation depends on asymmetries of power, often involving personal threats, online harassment, or professional discrediting, aimed at silencing voices. The focus on systematicity can help highlight how these attacks are organized, well-funded, and persistent, enabled by agents who have the resources and influence to maintain such a pressure over long time.
Finally, the conversation turned to institutional responses. Pinto and Leuschner stressed that strong institutional backing, through acknowledgment, legal protection, or mental health resources, can greatly support researchers’ resilience. Yet such responses face clear limits when the institutions themselves become targets of intimidation. What should be done when universities or research institutes are under coordinated attack remains an open challenge that demands further reflection on academic independence and the conditions that sustain it.